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AIRPORT FREIGHT AND PASSENGER SEARCHES:
APPLICATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
The systematic employment of searches to prevent aircraft hijackings
and the shipment of contraband has become a common practice in the
nation's airports. These searches, arising in a somewhat unusual context,
present a novel challenge to traditional liberties. Because of the possibil-
ities for abuse, it is necessary to determine the extent to which such
practices threaten an abridgement of the fourth amendment rights of in-
dividuals utilizing the services of the airlin'es industry. In examining this
question, this Note will focus upon the justifications and criticisms of
freight and passenger searches. Since different considerations apply to
each type of search, they will be discussed separately.
AmPORT FREIGHT SEARCHES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted
in response to the use of general warrants and writs of assistance by
British authorities.1 To prevent the recurrence of such practices, the
Constitution established the basic standard for a permissible search. To
be valid under the Constitution, a search must be reasonable and, with
limited exceptions, pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause.2
I. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1927). See generally N. LASSON, Ti
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNTED STATES CoNSTI-
=TON, 51-78 (1937); Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Crhninal Cases,
19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967).
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
2. There are two theories of the relationship between the "reasonableness" and "war-
rant" clauses of the fourth amendment. One theory suggests that the clauses are comple-
mentary; i.e., that a warrant is a necessary condition of "reasonableness" except in un-
usual circumstances. Adherents of the other theory treat the clauses as severable and
argue that warrantless searches should be judged only by the standard of reasonable-
ness. It has been suggested that with respect to searches, as opposed to seizures, the
Supreme Court has adopted the first position. Player, Warrantless Searcbes and Seizures,
5 GA. L. REv. 269 (1971). See also MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE S 171 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]. This view is supported by the language of several
recent Supreme Court decisions. For example, the court has stated that "except in cer-
tain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant," Camara v.
Municipal Ct, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967), and that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
[ 953 1
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrowly defined and
strictly construed to ensure fidelity to the fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The Supreme Court has declared
that the principles of the fourth amendment, "so carefully embodied in
the fundamental law, [are] not to be impaired by judicial sanction of
equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape
the challenge of illegality but which, in reality, strike at the substance
of the Constitutional right." 4
To the extent that airport searches proceed without judicial authoriza-
tion by warrant, there is a possibility of infringement upon fourth
amendment rights.5 In the context of airport searches of baggage and
freight not categorized as carry-on luggage, consideration must be given
to the applicability of the fourth amendment and the concomitant rule
of exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence, the concept of state action,
and the warrant requirement and its relevant exceptions. Throughout
the discussion, an attempt will be made to delineate the standards by
which the validity of airline freight inspections should be judged in
order to balance the interests of the airlines, law enforcement authorities,
and the individual. 6
Application of the Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule to Airline Inspections
Until Weeks v. United States,7 it was accepted at common law and
under the Constitution that the admissibility of evidence at trial was un-
related to any illegality of the means by which it was acquired.8 Al-
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
3. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
4. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1927).
5. National attention recently has been focused upon airport security measures. See
note 145 infra. The issue represents an area of, national concern as well as a constitu-
tional challenge. See generally Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 71 CoLuM. L. Rv. 1039 (1971).
6. The goal, of course, should be to provide the citizen with protection of provisions
of the fourth amendment where applicable, while providing adequate protection to the
rights of the airlines to control the types of goods which they ship. It is also necessary
to bear in mind the law enforcement problems which arise in the context of procedures
designed by the airlines to protect themselves.
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. McConmicK, supra note 2, § 165; 8 WIGMORE ON EVMENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev.
1961); 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 408 (1967).
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though in Weeks, the Supreme Court declared that evidence obtained
by federal officials in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible
in federal prosecutions, this rule of exclusion was not applicable in state
prosecutions nor could it be used to exclude from federal prosecutions
evidence illegally obtained by state officials. Moreover, since a historic
analysis of the Constitution indicated that the fourth amendment was
intended as a limitation upon sovereign authority 9 rather than a restraint
on the private activities of individuals, it was held that the exclusionary
rule could not be applied to searches and seizures conducted by private
citizens.10
The Weeks rule, however, subsequently was extended to include con-
duct of state as well as federal officials in both state and federal prosecu-
tions.1 A significant step in this evolution was the development of the
"silver platter" doctrine 2 and its ultimate repudiation in Elkins v. United
States. 3 Under the "silver platter" doctrine, evidence acquired by state
officers, even though under conditions violative of the fourth amend-
ment, was admissible in a federal court as long as federal authorities
had not taken part in the unreasonable search and seizure. In applying
this theory, the courts were forced to develop tests to determine the "d-
gree of federal involvement necessary to convert an illegal state search
into a federal search and thus justify the imposition of the rule of ex-
clusion. 14
9. "The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures...
its protection applies to governmental actions." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921).
10. Burdean v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); accord, Barnes v. United States,
373 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30,
35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); cf. United States v. Blum, 329 F.2d 49,
52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 -(1964).
11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), extended fourth amendment standards to
searches conducted by state officials but did not require the states to employ the ex-
clusionary rule in their own trials. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), applied
the rule of exclusion to federal trials where the evidence had been improperly obtained
by state officials. Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court, relying on
both the fourth and fourteenth amendments, applied the exclusionary rule to state trials.
12. The term was first used in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949), by
Justice Frankfurter.
13. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). For a discussion of the "silver platter" doctrine see Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts,
43 MiNm. L. REv. 1083 (1959).
14. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (where government partici-
pation in a state search is enough to make it a joint operation, it is as if search were
conducted solely by sovereign authority); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927)
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Although it has been argued that fourth amendment standards should
apply to searches conducted by private parties, 15 the courts,' 6 in the ab-
sence of a Supreme Court mandate to the contrary, have continued to
admit evidence under circumstances which, if federal or state officials
had participated, would require exclusion of such evidence.'7 Conse-
quently, in order to hold current airline inspection procedures subject
to the requirements of the fourth amendment, it is necessary to find that
such procedures constitute more than mere private searches. The most
obvious way to do so is to find sufficient government involvement in
airline inspections to warrant the conclusion that the airline is acting as
an agent of the government.' Despite the demise of the "silver platter"
doctrine, 9 the tests developed thereunder with regard to federal par-
ticipation in state searches may be applicable by analogy to government
involvement in private searches. In both situations, the inquiry concerns
a determination of the degree of government participation necessary to
invoke the standards of the fourth amendment.
Direct Government Involvement in Airline Inspections
The leading federal case on government participation in an airport
freight search is Corngold v. United States,20 which involved unusually
direct government action. Customs agents had placed the defendant un-
der surveillance. Employing a radiation detector and determining that
a package delivered by the defendant to Trans World Airlines (TWA)
for shipment probably contained illegally imported watch movements,
the government agents assisted an airline employee in opening the pack-
age. Although an inspection clause in the TWA tariff gave the airline
the right to inspect shipments "to determine their acceptability and to
(where search is solely in aid of the enforcement of a federal statute and fourth amend-
ment standards are not met, the fruits of the search are inadmissible).
15. United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964). See McCoRmicK, supra note 2, 5 168, at 372.
16. Hostility to the exclusionary rule on the part of state courts may be inferred
from the Supreme Court's discussion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
17. McCoiuancn supra note 2, § 168, at 372. See United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d
306, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); United States v. Goldberg,
330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
18. See United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y.
1969); People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404,462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
19. See notes 12-14 supra & accompanying text.
20. 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
956 [Vol. 14:953
AIR SEARCHES
determine proper charges thereon," 21 the court determined that absent
the request by government agents, the package would not have been
opened.22 From these factual determinations, the court further concluded
that the airline inspection was conducted "[s] olely to serve the purposes
of the government." 23 As a matter of law, it was held that:
The fruits of a search conducted solely in aid of the enforcement
of a federal statute, as this one was, are inadmissible when the
search fails to meet Fourth Amendment standards. The search was
in substance a federal search, cast in the form of a carrier inspec-
tion to enable the officers to avoid the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.24
Although characterizing the activity as a federal search, the court
declared that the 'evidence would have been excluded even if the airline
employee had not acted solely to satisfy the government interest. Active
government participation in the search rendered it a joint operation be-
tween the airline and the government. Evidence uncovered during a
joint operation is excludable "'even though the search would have been
lawful had the federal agents not participated." 25 The court, however,
distinguished the situation in which a carrier inspects packages for its
own purposes, discovers contraband, and thereafter notifies appropriate
authorities who secure a search warrant and conduct a search; under
such circumstances, according to the court, the search would suffer no
constitutional infirmities.2 6 This dictum presumably encompasses the
police search as well as the airline search entailed in such a situation.2 7
Invalidation of the search in Corngold was consistent with the purposes
21. Id. at 4n.3.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citation omitted). The court relied on Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S.
310 (1927).
25. 367 F.2d at 5-6. For this proposition, the court relied on tests for government par-
ticipation announced in "silver platter" cases. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
26. 367 F.2d at 6. A state court subsequently applied the court's dictum in determining
when the fourth amendment applies to airline inspections. People v. McKinnon,
7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972). A more detailed discussion of
independent airline purposes appears at notes 42-52 infra & accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of some of the problems posed by a double search situation see,
notes 116-23 infra & accompanying-text.
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underlying the exclusionary rule.28 Subsequent cases indicate that the
decision had its desired effect by deterring similar government action.29
In determining whether there has been sufficient governmental in-
volvement to characterize a private search as "a federal search, cast in
the form of a carrier inspection," 8 0 it is necessary to ascertain whether
the search was the result of explicit sovereign inducement, instigation, or
request, and whether government officials participated directly in the
search. Corngold indicates that if, but only if, either of these elements is
present, fourth amendment requirements are applicable. Except in the
Second Circuit,81 subsequent cases have applied the Corngold test in de-
termining whether the actions of airline employees should be character-
ized as those of the government.82
Two years prior to Corngold, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided United States v. Blum, 88 in which a Railway Express
Agency (REA) agent in California became suspicious of a package de-
livered to the express agency by a "Mexican" who had shipped a similar
package the previous day.34 The suspicious REA employee notified cus-
28. The policy basis for applying the rule of exclusion is to compel "respect for the
Constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 (1961), the Supreme Court confirmed that the principal purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional practices. Justice Black's concurring opinion
in Mapp suggested that fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination are violated
when evidence procured in violation of the Constitution is admitted. Id. at 661, criticized
in Bender, The Retroactive Effect Of An Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v.
Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 664-68 (1962).
29. See United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972); Gold v. United States,
378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967). In neither of these cases did government agents repeat the
mistake of requesting the airline to make a search. Instead, the FBI agents involved
merely informed the airline of waybill discrepancies. Since the airline inspections were
not the result of a government request but were deemed by the courts to be pursuant
to independent airline interests, the evidence was not excluded. Both cases may proper-
ly be viewed as governmental reaction to Corngold.
30. 367 F.2d at 5.
31. See notes 33-38 infra & accompanying text.
32. E.g., Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Chaires v. State, 480
S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
33. 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
34. It is questionable whether the fact that the shipper was "Mexican" could provide
probable cause to search. In United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), the court based exclusion of evidence obtained by a search of the defendant on
the grounds that there was no statistical evidence indicating a proclivity of the de-
fendant's race towards hijacking. One of the reasons the defendant had been subjected
to a search was his Latin-American descent. See note 249 hfra & accompanying text.
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toms agents, who, using an electronic device, determined that the con-
tents of the package had been misdeclared on the waybill. The package
was opened to expose illegally imported watch movements. Customs
agents in New York were informed, and the previously shipped package
was located. When electronic tests indicated the possible existence of
cont aband, the customs agents secured REA permission to open the
package. Notwithstanding the existence of government instigation and
direct participation, the validity of the search was upheld, the court
basing its decision upon the right of inspection reserved in the REA
tariff.
Although the Ninth Circuit rationale in Corngold draws the validity
of Blum into question, decisions in the Second Circuit have continued
to cite Blum with approval.3 5 Indeed, in United States v. Averell, a New
York federal district court explicitly indicated that Corngold was not
followed in the Second Circuit.3 6 In Averell, airline employees, suspicious
of the contents of several trunks delivered to them for shipment, opened
one trunk in the presence of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents, who later opened the other trunks themselves. The crucial evi-
dence in the case was gained from the contents of the trunks opened by
the government agents.3 7 In a jurisdiction applying the tests set forth
in Corngold, the evidence obtained through government participation
would have been excluded.38
The divergent holdings in the Second and Ninth Circuits appear to re-
sult from a conflict as to the vitality of tests employed by the Supreme
Court in the "silver platter" cases. In those cases, the Court was con-
cerned with the degree of federal influence permissible in a state search
before that search could be characterized as one by the federal govern-
ment. For example, in Lustig v. United States,39 the Court commented:
35. In United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1972) the Court of, Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit relied on Blum in holding that the carrier inspection at
issue "was not so infused with governmental participation as to constitute a federal
search...."
36. 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Blum as authority).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 312 F. Supp. 950 (CD. Cal. 1970), in which the
court suppressed as evidence four cartons, which, however, were not necessary to con-
viction, while admitting into evidence two others. FBI agents, without a search war-
rant, had participated in opening the four cartons which were suppressed. The other
two cartons were admitted because airline employees- had opened them without the
assistance of federal agents.
39. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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[A] search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it
.... The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the
Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the
total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than
sanctioned means. It is immaterial whether a federal agent origi-
nated the idea or joined in it while the search was in progress.
So long as he was in it before the object of the search was com-
pletely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in
it. Where there is participation on the part of federal officers it
is not necessary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted solely by state officers. Evidence secured
through such federal participation is inadmissible for the same con-
siderations as those which made Weeks v. United States the gov-
erning principle in federal prosecutions. 40
Although Lustig and the other "silver platter" cases have been over-
ruled, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Corngold, in de-
termining the degree to which the government may be involved in a
private search before that search becomes subject to the commands of
the fourth amendment, 41 referred to and employed tests similar to those
applied in Lustig. In light of the similarity of analysis in the "silver plat-
ter" and private search cases, it is submitted that the application of such
tests by analogy has merit. However, the Second Circuit, by continuing
to follow Blun, apparently has rejected any such analogy.
Even courts adopting the position of the Ninth Circuit have been
unwilling to find a violation of the fourth amendment and to apply the
exclusionary rule where government officials have not directly instigated
or participated in the private search.42 This trend is consistent with the
tests employed in the "silver platter" cases and has developed, in part,
from the Ninth Circuit's limitation of Corngold in Gold v. United
States.43 In Gold, FBI agents informed the airline customer service man-
ager that they had reason to believe that the contents of certain pack-
ages delivered to the airline were not accurately declared on the waybill
and that the address the defendant had given was fictitious. The govern-
ment agents neither divulged what they thought the packages to contain
nor were present when the packages were searched by the airline man-
40. Id. at 78-79 (citation omitted).
41. See notes 20-27 supra & accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 341 F. Supp. 302, 305 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Chaires
v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
43. 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
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ager and found to contain pornographic films. In permitting introduction
of the films as evidence, the court noted that the search was "an inde-
pendent investigation by the carrier for its own purposes" and "the dis-
cretionary action of the airline's manager." a4
Thus, it is clear from Corngold and Gold that the purpose for which
the airline undertakes the search may be an important factor in determin-
ing whether the inspection can be characterized as a "federal search cast
in the form of a carrier inspection." Inferentially, it would appear that a
search conducted by an airline solely to discover contraband to be used
as evidence in a criminal prosecution is unrelated to any airline purpose.
Consequently, because the airline is merely fulfilling a government pur-
pose (prosecution), such a search should be required to meet fourth
amendment standards. It should be noted, however, that an airline usual-
ly will have independent grounds upon which to inspect packages en-
trusted to it.45 There is no dispute that an airline inspection undertaken
at the initiative of airline employees, for independent airline purposes,
and without government participation, is a private search and is not
subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment."6 Independent
airline purposes for such inspections apparently include detection of
insurance frauds,47 detection of rate cheating through improper declara-
tion of contents,48 ensuring that airline facilities are not being used in
the commission of a crime,49 protection of the aircraft and other freight,"0
identification of the owner of unclaimed luggage, 51 and the insulation of
the airline from criminal liability for transporting certain items.52
Moreover, the fact that government authorities previously have re-
quested airline employees to watch for and notify the police of suspicious
44. 378 F.2d at 591.
45. See People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 913-14, 500 P.2d 1097, 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr.
897, 907 (1972).
46. See, e.g., Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. McKinnon,
7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
47. See People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 407, 462 P.2d 1, 3, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475
(1969).
48. See United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
49. See People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 914, 500 P.2d 1097, 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr.
897, 907 (1972).
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Echols, 348 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mo. 1972); State v. Larko, 6
Conn. Cir. 564, 280 A.2d 153 (1971).
52. See United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
It also has been held that an airline inspection resulting from an attempt to protect
luggage which has sprung open is a search for the independent purposes of the air-
line. See Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E_2d 137 (1971)
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individuals or packages does not necessarily create a police agency re-
lationship which requires application of fourth amendment standards.5 3
One court, however, has noted that a close working relationship be-
tween law enforcement authorities and an airline employee "may be
tantamount to joint action and make the freight agent's action in opening
suspicious baggage police action." 54 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has stated that "the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not
to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency." 55
Because of the frequency of prosecutions resulting from airline freight
searches,5 6 airline employees should be familiar with the constitutional
standards relating to searches and seizures.57 Therefore, if it is determined
that there was sufficient contact with the police to establish an agency
relationship and that the search by airline 'employees did not comply
with constitutional standards, the exclusionary rule should apply. If the
searchers are aware of the constitutional requirements, they presumably
will modify their behavior as necessary to secure convictions. 8 Hence,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would be accomplished.
The courts, however, may face the necessity of weighing the bene-
ficial effects of applying the exclusionary rule against the airlines' legiti-
mate interests in knowing what they are transporting. Extensive ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule might inhibit needed airline inspections
and allow obvious criminal activity to go unpunished. It is arguable that
an individual's civil remedies provide adequate redress for violation of
his fourth amendment rights and that the exclusionary rule should be
given a more limited application in order to aid the successful prosecu-
tion of criminal activity.59 The Supreme Court, however, has not been
53. People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 914, 500 P.2d 1097, 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897,
907 (1972).
54. State v. Birdwell, 6 Wash. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972).
55. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964).
56. One writer has characterized such searches as "institutionalized private searches:'
Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. Rzv. 608, 614-
16 (1967).
57. See People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 904-05, 500 P.2d 1097, 1100-01, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 900-01 (1972), in which an airline freight agent testified that he followed a
certain procedure to ensure that any evidence uncovered would not be excluded in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. This airline employee not only was aware of consti-
tutional limitations, but also was interested in the defendant's conviction.
58. See notes 28-29 supra & accompanying text.
59. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the
Supreme Court declared that there is a private remedy for violations of fourth amend-
ment rights. Although a discussion of civil remedies with respect to airline inspections is
beyond the scope of this Note, it should be noted that individuals alleging abuse of their
[Vol. 14:953
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hospitable to such arguments, declaring that the inability to prosecute
some guilty individuals may be the price of preserving constitutional
rights.60
The Airlines' Right to Inspect and the Concept of State Action
In many of the cases involving airline inspections, the right to inspect
was reserved to the airlines by tariff regulations approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB).61 It appears that in most such cases, the air-
line's right to inspect on such a basis has been conceded.62 To the ex-
tent, however, that inspection clauses contained in shipping contracts
incorporating airline tariff regulations do not make provision for con-
sent by the shipping party meeting constitutional standards,63 there may
be a constitutional basis for attacking airline inspections even where
there is no direct government involvement.64
It is arguable that an airline inspection based upon government-ap-
proved tariff regulations or a state or federal statute cannot be considered
a strictly private search. The argument is based not upon an agency
theory but upon the concept of state or government action under which
the government "should be held responsible where private organizations
operate pursuant to a scheme of statutory regulation and encourage-
constitutional rights with respect to their "papers and effects" may be able to recover
damages on theories of trespass or interference with chattel. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
Or TORTs § 217 (1964).
60. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960).
61. E.g., United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466, 472 (D.D.C. 1970); People v. Mc-
Grew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 411 n.3, 462 P.2d 1, 5 n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 n.3 (1969); Chaires
v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196, 199 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
The tariff involved in Corngold provided that "[s]hipments are subject to inspection
by carriers to determine their acceptability and to determine proper charges thereon."
367 F.2d at 4 n.3. In Averell, the applicable tariff provided that "[s]hipments shall be
subject to inspections by the carrier." 296 F. Supp. at 1009.
62. See, e.g., Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61, 62 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968). In United
States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (DD.C. 1970), the court seemed to beg the consti-
tutional question by characterizing the airline's inspection as a private search to which
the Constitution does not apply. The constitutional issue is whether a private search
can be based on a government regulation which does not require conformity with the
fourth amendment. See Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply
to Professor Wecbsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
63. The consent issue is discussed at notes 124-33 infra & accompanying text.
64. If the inspection clauses were not based upon government-approved tariffs, there
could be a private remedy for such inspections, since the Supreme Court has held that
in the absence of statutes conferring the right to inspect, or in the absence of reasonable
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ment." 61 The obvious response to this argument is that the government
is not approving or encouraging unconstitutional activities on the part
of the airlines; rather, it is merely affirming private practices which are
permissible under the fourth amendment. This suggestion, however, ap-
pears to ignore recent decisions concerning state action,6 6 in which pri-
vate activity has been so involved with that of the government as to re-
quire the imposition of constitutional restraints. 67
Government involvement in the airlhne industry is pervasive. Airlines
operate pursuant to certificates granted by a government agency, their
routes and rates are regulated by government agencies, and certain of
their policies affecting the public are subject to Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) or CAB approval. Specifically, the airlines' right to
inspect shipments is derived from a CAB tariff regulation."5 To the ex-
tent that constitutional limitations are ignored when airlines inspect ship-
ments on the basis of such government-approved tariff provisions, con-
cepts of state action may provide a sufficient basis for invoking the ex-
clusionary rule as a safeguard of fourth amendment rights since, for con-
stitutional purposes, where sufficient state action is found, what otherwise
would be private activity is treated as government activity.69
The mere fact that the airlines are public carriers regulated by a gov-
ernment regulatory agency might be sufficient to constitute the requisite
state action. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,70 for example, the
grounds to suspect the offered goods are of a dangerous or illegal nature, a common
carrier may not condition shipment upon a right to inspect. Parrot v. Wells, Fargo &
Co., 82 US. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872). See 13 Am. JUR. 2d, Carriers § 238 (1964).
65. Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLuM. L. REv.
1039, 1044 (1971). See generally Note, A Comment on The Exclusion of Evidence
Wrongfully Obtained by Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 271, 274.
66. As used in this discussion, "state action" comprehends the activity of the federal
government as well as that of state governments.
One theory of state action suggests that corporations, which would include airlines,
should be subject to constitutional limitations since they are created by the state and
have sufficient economic powers to invade individuals' constitutional rights. See Berle,
Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 933, 942-43 (1952).
67. An excellent review of state action decisions may be found in Commissioner
Johnson's dissent in In re Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d
242, 253-65 (1970). See generally, Downs & McGinley, Airport Searches and Seizures-
A Reasonable Approach, 41 FoRD Am L. Rv. 293 (1972).
68. CAB No. 96, Rule No. 24 (Nov. 8, 1967), cited in People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d
404,411 n.3, 462 P.2d 1, 5 n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473,477 n.3 (1969).
69. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).
70. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
[Vol. 14:953
AIR SEARCHES
court determined that action by a privately owned public transportation
facility was to be considered government activity for constitutional pur-
poses. The requisite state action was found in the direct supervision of
the corporation by a regulatory agency authorized by Congress.71 An-
other court has noted that there "is ample authority for the principle
that specific governmental approval of or acquiescence in challenged
action by a private organization indicates 'state action.' "72
It may be argued that the landmark state action decision in Shelly v.
Kraemer73 provides a basis for extension of the exclusionary rule to pri-
vate action. The Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of a
racially discriminatory restrictive covenant constituted state action with-
in the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Applying this rationale by
analogy to airline inspections and fourth amendment principles, the mere
searching for and discovery of contraband would not be prohibited;
however, the use of that evidence in a criminal prosecution would be
proscribed.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority74 also may find application in the airline inspection cases. It
was held that where a state leased space in a public building to a privately
operated restaurant and permitted operation of the restaurant on a racial-
ly discriminatory basis, the state had "elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." 7 Thus, the Court
found sufficient state action in the state's acquiescence in the discrimina-
tory policies to apply constitutional restraints on the operation of the
restaurant. The same reasoning could be applied in cases involving air-
line inspections which do not meet fourth amendment standards, where
71. Id. at 462.
72. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972).
73. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Note, A Comment on the Exclusion of Evidence Wrong-
fully Obtained by Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 271, 274.
It has been suggested that the Shelly rationale is too broad and should not be em-
ployed as a basis for extending the exclusionary rule to private searches. Note, Seizures
by Private Parties: Exchution in Criminal Cases, 19 STArN. L. REv. 608, 614 (1967). This
argument is based on the conclusion that the deterrent function of. the exclusionary
rule would not be served by extending the rule to private searches. However, in the
context of airline inspections where freight agents constantly engage in inspections and
later testify in court, it would appear that application of the exclusionary rule might
deter practices which do not conform to constitutional standards. See note 57 supra
& accompanying text.
74. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
75. Id. at 725.
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the airport involved was constructed with public funds and the airline
conducting the search is a state or municipal lessee.76
Although there have been no cases involving airline inspections which
specifically have considered the state action issue, the court in United
States v. Burton77 considered the agency implications of a federal statute7 8
imposing criminal liability on airlines which shipped firearms with rea-
sonable cause to believe such shipment would violate federal law. The
court reasoned that since the statute did not require an airline inspection,
no agency relationship was involved when airline employees did insti-
tute a search and that a search by airline 'employees under such circum-
stances was for airline purposes. 9 It is submitted, however, that an an-
alysis of state action should be applicable where statutes impose criminal
liability for the transport of contraband or other illegal shipments. The
fact that a statute provides the impetus for the search ought to be suf-
ficient for a finding of state action. For the search to be constitutionally
valid, it would have to conform to the standards of the fourth amend-
ment, and, where such conformity is lacking, evidence secured by the
search should be excluded.80
The Constitutional Standards
Having considered the theories upon which freight inspections by air-
line employees may be subjected to the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, it is necessary to examine those requirements. A constitutionally
valid search must be reasonable and, in most cases, pursuant to a war-
rant issued on the basis of probable cause.8' Although necessity has
required the development of limited exceptions to the warrant require-
76. See Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM L. REv.
1039, 1045. Many airports are constructed with public funds and operated by public
agencies, which lease space to airlines.
77. 341 F. Supp. 302 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
78. 18U.S.C. § 922(f) (1970).
79. The "airline purposes" discussed by the court were the protection of passengers
and aircraft. 341 F. Supp. at 306. In view of the statutes, however, it would appear that
another purpose of the search was to protect the airlines from criminal liability.
80. Where a statute imposes liability on an airline for making a shipment which it
has "reasonable cause to believe" would be in violation of the law, the probable cause
standard of the fourth amendment is not vitiated by the statute. See MCCORMICr, supra
note 2, § 170, at 377 (probable cause synonymous with reasonableness). An airline search
consistent with the standard of "reasonable cause to believe" that shipment of the goods
would violate the law thus would have to meet only the warrant requirement or an
exception thereto. See notes 81-84 infra & accompanying text.
81. See note 2 supra.
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ment, even a warrantless search must be based upon probable cause.82 As
a general rule, however, probable cause for conducting a search does not
justify a search without a warrant. 88 Assuming that the fourth amend-
ment is applicable to airline inspections, either on the basis of direct gov-
ern'ent involvement or under a theory of state action, evidence dis-
covered in such inspections must be excluded unless the search was
founded upon probable cause. Moreover, the search may be valid with-
out a warrant only if the surrounding circumstances were within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.8 4 It is thus neces-
sary to examine several of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
which may be relevant to airline inspections.
Exigent Circumstances
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable where "[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on
balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of
privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may
be dispensed with." 85 However, mere inconvenience to law enforce-
ment officials resulting from the minor delay involved in submitting the
issue of probable cause to a magistrate is not sufficient to justify invoking
the exception.8 6 The exigent circumstances exception is generally ap-
plicable only where a search or seizure with a warrant would be im-
possible.87 Where a warrantless search is conducted, the burden is upon
the prosecution to justify the search by demonstrating the exigent cir-
82. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US. 42, 51 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 US.
752 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
83. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961). The general rule is subject
to various exceptions. See note 84 supra. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), the Supreme Court held that where a police officer has reasonable grounds to
fear for his safety or that of others, he may conduct a limited search for weapons.
84. The limited exceptions t6 the warrant requirement may be classified as follows:
search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); hot pur-
suit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); imminent destruction of known evidence,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); plain view, Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968); protective weapons search, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); customs
or border search, Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966):
85. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
86. Id. at 15.
87. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 US. 102, 107 n.2, citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
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cumstances.8 s Once it is shown that the circumstances justified dispensing
with a search warrant, the test is whether the search itself was reason-
able. 9
It is the "exigencies of time and the possible removal of the contraband
to another state [which create] an emergency-'an exigent circum-
stance.' "90 In the context of airline inspections, however, removal of
suspected contraband is not always imminent; moreover, in those in-
stances in which removal is imminent, transport to another jurisdiction
may not always be involved. In Corngold, for example, the government
failed to carry its burden of showing that the packages in question might
be removed before customs agents could obtain a search warrant. 91 More-
over, even if the government had introduced evidence that shipment of
the packages was imminent, the court could still have justified a refusal
to apply the exigent circumstances exception. Since the law enforcement
officials involved were federal customs agents and since the planned ship-
ment was to New York, the goods were not being shipped beyond the
jurisdiction in which the agents had authority.
Where, however, state officials have probable cause to believe that a
package containing contraband is about to be flown to another state,
they should be able, without obtaining a warrant, to search and seize
that article if removal appears sufficiently imminent.92 In such a situation,
the exigent circumstances exception should apply, since the airline is un-
der no obligation to delay shipment in order to afford police an oppor-
tunity to secure a search warrant 93 and since the rationale underpinning
the exigent circumstances exception is to allow a constitutional search
without a warrant in situations where a search with a warrant would be
impossible. 94
The question of how imminent removal must be before the exigent
circumstances exception is applicable appears to be unsettled. For ex-
ample, in People v. McGreW95 it was held that removal was not sufficient-
ly imminent where the shipment was to be on a space available basis. In
88. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.48, 52 (1951).
89. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
90. Clayton v. United States, 413 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911 (1970).
91. 367 F.2d at 3.
92. See Chaires v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
93. Id. at 199.
94. See note 87 supra & accompanying text.
95. 1 Cal. 3d 404,462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
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People v. McKinnon,6 however, the California Supreme Court over-
ruled its decision in McGrew, 7 holding that there is sufficient danger of
imminent removal to justify a warrantless police search based on prob-
able cause whenever articles have been delivered to an airline for ship-
ment. The court relied on Chambers v. Maroney,98 in which the Su-
preme Court held that the mobile character of an automobile creates an
exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search for suspected con-
traband in that automobile. 99
Application of the exigent circumstances exception to permit a war-
rantless search based upon probable cause would appear justified where
the objects of the search are aboard an aircraft awaiting departure, where
the time for shipment is uncertain, or where the goods have reached
their destination and are subject to removal by the owner or consignee.
If, however, it is found that removal is not sufficiently imminent to justi-
fy application of the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless
search could still be based on another of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
A frequently applied exception to the requirement of a warrant as
the mark of a reasonable search arises in the context of a search incident
to an arrest.' ° Although a search, in order to be constitutionally reason-
able, must generally be accompanied by a warrant, an arrest in many
instances does not.'0' The validity of a warrantless search incident to an
arrest is based upon the right of an arresting officer to protect himself
and upon the need to prevent destruction of evidence. 10 2 The search may
extend to the area within the subject's control from which he might
procure a weapon or within which he might destroy evidence.0 3 A valid
search incident to an arrest, however, requires compliance with the ar-
rest standard of probable cause. 0 4 Probable cause is established "if the
96. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal Rptr. 897 (1972).
97. The McKinnon court also overruled Abt v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 418, 462
P.2d 10, 82 Cal Rptr. 379 (1969), a decision similar to McGrew.
98. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
99. Chambers also was relied upon in Chaires v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972), where the suspect luggage was aboard an aircraft due to depart momentarily.
100. See generally McCoRMscK supra note 2, § 173; Player, supra note 2, at 278.
101. Id.
102. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
103. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
104. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in
believing that the offense has been committed." 105
Information from an airline agent that certain luggage or freight con-
tains contraband may provide a police officer with probable cause to
arrest the individual in possession of that luggage or freight." 6 There-
after, a warrantless search of the articles containing the contraband
could be justified as a search incident to an arrest if there is danger, for
example, that the subject may destroy the evidence.1 7
Probable Cause
Even though the circumstances surrounding a search justify applica-
tion of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, there must be
probable cause to search in any instance where the requirements of the
fourth amendment are applicable. Probable cause to search requires more
than mere suspicion and must be determined in light of all the circum-
stances in any particular situation.108 In the context of airport searches,
the following factors have been found to establish probable cause to
search: the shape and design of a package and manner in which it is
carried;0 9 an odor emanating from the package or suitcase;"0 unusual
weight of the luggage;"' nervous behavior of the person offering the
article for shipment;"12 traits and circumstances similar to previous inci-
dents involving the shipment of contraband;"' and general peculiar cir-
cumstances surrounding the receipt of the shipment." 4
The existence of facts establishing probable cause to search will, at
some point, be objectively scrutinized by a judge. When application is
made for a search warrant, the objective determination is made before
the search. When the search is conducted without a warrant, the judicial
105. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964).
106. See, e.g., People v. Hankin, - Colo. -, 498 P.2d 116 (1972); People v. Hively, 173
Colo. 485, 480 P.2d 558 (1971).
107. However, the search must be contemporaneous with the arrest. Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
108. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 104 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
109. E.g., People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
110. E.g., Chaires v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
111. E.g., Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968).
112. E.g., State v. Birdwell, 6 Wash. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972).
113. E.g., Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966).
114. E.g, United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (DD.C. 1970).
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scrutiny necessarily must take place after the search. In either case, the
searcher "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably war-
rant [the] intrusion." 115
The Subsequent Search
Many of the cases which have considered the issue of exclusion of evi-
dence procured through airport freight inspections have involved a search
by law enforcement authorities who were notified by airline employees
after an initial inspection. The courts have taken two approaches in de-
termining the status of the second search.
In People v. McGrew"6 and Abt v. Superior Court17 the California
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the airline in-
spection was subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment, since
it based exclusion of the evidence on the ground that the subsequent
police search was subject to fourth amendment requirements which it
had failed to meet. Subsequently, in People v. McKinnon" s the same
court, after declining to rule on the validity of the airline inspection in
the absence of evidence on the question of agency, held that the subse-
quent search by police met fourth amendment standards.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, employed a
different approach in Clayton v. United States"19 and Wolf Low v.
United States.120 In Wolf Low, after concluding that the discovery of
the contraband by airline employees was the result of a private search
not subject to constitutional limitations, the court held that since the
evidence already was uncovered, subsequent acts of the police did not
constitute a search and that the evidence, therefore, was admissible. The
court's reasoning was less clear in Clayton, a per curiam decision. Al-
though relying on Wolf Low in holding that "the subsequent acts of
the police did not constitute a search," 121 the court noted that there
had been "exigent circumstances" surrounding the subsequent acts of
the police. It is not clear why the court found it necessary to discuss one
of the exceptions to the requirement of a warrant for a constitutionally
115. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See notes 171-88 infra & accompanying text.
116. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
117. 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P.2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969).
118. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
119. 413 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).
120. 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968).
121. 413 F.2d at 298.
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valid search after determining that the activity in question did not con-
stitute a search in the first instance.
The Supreme Court stated in Terry v. Ohio2 2 that a search which
initially is valid may become illegal as its scope broadens unless all the
steps taken can be independently reconciled with the fourth amendment.
It is submitted that a court considering a case involving a police search
subsequent to an airline inspection should test both searches against the
requirements of the Constitution.121 If the airline inspection is found to
have been subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment, either
on an agency theory or under concepts of state action, and if it is found
that such inspection was constitutionally defective, then there is no need
to examine the subsequent police action, since the evidence already is
tainted. If, however, the initial search met constitutional requirements or
was valid as a mere private search, the validity of a subsequent search
by law enforcement personnel should be examined independently. Un-
der such circumstances, the question should be whether the police search
was broader in scope than the airline inspection. If the subsequent search
went no further than the airline inspection, it would be possible to apply
the Wolf Low rationale that the police activity was not a search in the
constitutional sense. In conformity with the statement of the Supreme
Court in Terry, however, if the scope of the police search extended
beyond that of the valid airline inspection, the subsequent activity must
be independently reconciled with the standards of the fourth amend-
ment.
Consent or Waiver
Finally, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which an
individual will be considered to have waived his fourth amendment rights
by consenting to a search. If a waiver is found, neither a warrant nor
probable cause is required to validate a search. 124 The Supreme Court
has stated that a valid waiver of fundamental constitutional rights must
122. 392 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1968).
123. See Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227, 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
The question does not arise in cases similar to Corngold in which the airline inspection
and government search take place simultaneously with respect to the same article. Ex-
cept in those courts following the rationale of, the Second Circuit (see notes 33-38 supra
& accompanying text) the validity of such activity will be dependent upon compliance
with fourth amendment requirements.
124. See generally McCoRMicx, supra note 2, § 175; Note, Effective Consent to Search
and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964); Note, Third Party Consent to Search and
Seizure, 1967 WAsH. U.L.Q. 12.
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constitute "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." .21
Airline tariff provisions reserving to the airline the right to inspect
have provided the basis for consent arguments in the airline inspection
cases.' 26 The question has not been considered, however, whether the ex-
istence of such provisions in a shipment contract results in the informed
consent which the Supreme Court traditionally has required for an ef-
fective waiver of constitutional rights. In People v. McGrew, 2 7 for ex-
ample, a receipt given the defendant for the goods which he attempted
to ship contained a paragraph located on the reverse side in gray type
stating that the shipment was subject to governing tariffs. There was no
direct reference to the CAB-approved inspection clause which was in-
corporated into the tariffs and thus into the shipment contract. 2 , In
holding that the invalidity of a police search was unaffected by the
presence of this provision, the court stated that consent to a search by
the airline was not consent to a police search unrelated to airline pur-
poses.129 It is arguable that the court could have reached the same result
on the basis of the failure of the inspection clause to meet the traditional
requirements for a waiver of constitutional rights.
An issue involved in Corngold v. United States'30 was the effect on the
rights of an individual of an airline's consent to a police search of that
individual's goods. Noting that fourth amendment rights are personal to
the individual whose effects are searched, the court stated that such rights
can be waived only by the individual, either directly or through an
agent. It was held that although the consent may have been valid as to
the airline's limited purposes, the tariff authorized inspection only by
the carrier and that the defendant had neither expressly nor impliedly
authorized the carrier to consent to a search by government officials.
A different approach to the consent question was employed in United
States v. Averell,'3' in which, as in Corngold, government agents pardci-
125. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Although Johnson dealt with the
right to counsel, there is no dispute that fourth amendment rights are fundamental.
126. E.g., United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466, 472 (D.D.C. 1970); People v. Mc-
Grew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 411 n.3, 462 P.2d 1, 5 n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 n.3 (1969); Chaires
v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196, 199 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
127. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
128. Arguably, the inspection clause was not even incorporated into the contract,
there being no direct reference to it.
129. 1 Cal. 3d 404,413,462 P.2d 1, 6,82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 479 (1969).
130. 367 F.2d 1, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1966).
131. 296 F. Supp. 1004 (ED.N.Y. 1969).
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pated in opening the articles consigned to the airline for shipment. The
court determined that the government participation was at the request
and in the interest of the airline in order to prevent damage to the arti-
cles and to determine whether those articles contained contraband for
the shipment of which the airline would incur liability. In distinguishing
Corngold, the court noted that the tariff involved in Averell limited
neither the purpose nor the extent of the inspection. Furthermore, the
tariff provided that the shipper comply with all applicable laws, customs
regulations, and other government regulations. Despite the seemingly
unambiguous language of the tariff and the apparent validity of the
court's reasoning, however, it nowhere appears that the defendant in-
tentionally or knowledgeably waived his fourth amendment rights with
respect to the search by the government agents.
Thus, resolution of consent questions may depend upon the wording
of the particular airline's inspection clause. Consent to an inspection by
airline employees is not necessarily consent to a search by third parties.
Moreover, even if it is determined that an inspection clause included
consent to a search involving government agents, a valid waiver of fourth
amendment rights requires that the consent have been given intentionally
and with knowledge of those rights.
Because the airlines have legitimate reasons to inspect shipments en-
trusted to them,132 it is arguable that constitutional consent standards
should not apply to searches related to limited airline purposes. More-
over, ineffective consent problems as to searches beyond those limited
purposes could be avoided by requiring all shippers, as a condition of
carriage, to sign an agreement with the airline which explains fourth
amendment rights and permits the airline to authorize a search by law
enforcement officials in appropriate circumstances. There is no consti-
tutional right to ship freight without meeting the carrier's lawful condi-
tions. However, to the extent that such an agreement is required of per-
sons shipping articles incident to their own travel, it is subject to the
argument that the exercise of the constitutional right to travel may not
be conditioned on the relinquishment of another constitutional right.133
Conclusion
The frequency with which state and federal prosecutions result from
evidence secured through airline freight inspections suggests the exist-
132. See notes 47-52 supra & accompanying text.
133. See notes 202-35 infra & accompanying text.
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ence of an informal scheme of cooperation between the government and
the airline industry. Although society, government, and the airline in-
dustry have an interest in preventing the airlines from being used as
vehicles for crime, the interests of all segments of society are best served
when constitutional safeguards are incorporated into law enforcement
activities. As Justice Brandeis remarked:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions
for the security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued .... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the Con-
stitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis....134
Agency theories which developed during the evolution of fourth
amendment safeguards as well as more recently developed theories of
state action provide a rational basis for imposing the requirements of
the fourth amendment on airline inspections. Fourth amendment stand-
ards should certainly be applicable in many cases to government activity
subsequent to airline inspections. In light of the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment as well as
the possibility of obtaining shippers' consent to search, the constitutional
requirements are not unduly burdensome to effective law enforcement.
Compliance with fourth amendment principles adequately protects the
interests of the individual citizen, the airlines, officials charged with law
enforcement, and society generally.
The more publicized search activity in the nation's airports involves
the federal anti-hijack security system. The searching of individuals
about to board airplanes also involves a challenge to fourth amendment
rights, with many of the issues being distinct from those involved in
freight searches.
AIRPORT PASSENGER SEARCHES
The current federal anti-hijacking program, with which all licensed
operators in air transportation and commerce must comply, presents
serious challenges to the fourth amendment rights of air travelers as well
as to their right to travel freely throughout the United States and
134. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,635 (1886).
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abroad.18 Designed to prevent and deter aircraft hijacking through a
weapons detection system,"" the program also serves to uncover evi-
dence of criminal acts which already have taken place, since it is unlaw-
ful to attempt to board a commercial aircraft while carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon. 3 7 The program was prompted by what the courts
have conceded to b-e a compelling interest on the part of the airlines,
the public, and government in air safety. 38 Juxtaposed against this sub-
stantial government interest, however, are the constitutional rights of
individual passengers to travel 89 and to be free from unreasonable search-
es and seizures. 40
There has not yet been a satisfactory resolution of these conflicting
fundamental interests. However, since the factual basis giving rise to the
problem is relatively novel' 4 ' and since there are indications that the
135. After Feb. 6, 1972, each licensed common carrier was required to adopt and
employ a screening system acceptable to the FAA, "to prevent or deter the carriage
aboard its aircraft of any sabotage device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about
the persons of passengers." 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1972). This regulation later was amended
to provide more explicit instructions as to the requirements for an acceptable security
system, to provide the FAA Administrator with the power to approve such systems, and
to provide for emergency amendment of such systems by the Administrator. 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.538, as anended, 37 Fed. Reg. 7151 (1972).
136. It is a federal crime for unauthorized persons to carry arms or other dangerous
and deadly weapons aboard "an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air trans-
portation," to have such items about their persons, or to attempt to board such an air-
craft with such items. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (L) (1970).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Ep-
person, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
139. The Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another . . . occupies
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized . . . . [TIhat
right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been
suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning
to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution
created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
140. See note 1 supra.
141. It was not until October 1968 that a Task Force representing the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Commerce, among
others, was appointed to consider means of. stemming the increasing tide of aircraft
hijackings. This task force began the efforts that resulted in the "Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration System for Discouraging and Apprehending Potential Hijackers.' See United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The FAA did not mandate
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screening procedures are being used for purposes other than limited
weapons searches, 142 there has been a considerable amount of activity in
the courts concerning airport passenger searches. The evolution of sub-
stantive standards has been slow because of the changing nature of the
industry-government approach to the problem of airplane hijackings
and because of the high degree of interest in creating and allowing an
effective response to a problem which has reached emergency propor-
tions.
The Constitutional Issues
Not surprisingly, the pre-boarding passenger search entails legal prob-
lems very different from those encountered in airline freight searches.
In passenger searches, for -example, there can be little dispute that gov-
ernment or state action, rather than private action, is involved. An
amendment to the Federal Aviation Regulations requires that airport
operators provide at least one law enforcement officer "vested with a
police power of arrest under Federal, State, or other political subdivision
authority [to be present during the] final passenger screening process
prior to boarding." 143 It is, therefore, likely that pre-boarding searches in
the immediate future will be conducted by persons vested with the police
powers of the state; consequently, the strictures of the fourth amend-
ment clearly are applicable. Moreover, as was indicated in the discus-
sion on cargo searches, direct participation of federal or state officials in
"private" searches may not be necessary to require application of fourth
amendment standards. Passenger searches are conducted pursuant to
prescribed procedures embodied in statutory mandates, 44 for which
non-compliance by either the airline or airport may result in the im-
the use of anti-hijacking screening systems by private carriers until Feb. 6, 1972. See note
135 supra.
142. One commentator has noted that "civil libertarians . . . fear that 'weapons
searches' are being used by some law enforcement authorities as a pretext to search
for narcotics and other contraband unrelated to hijacking. They point out that of 6,000
persons arrested in the 22 months since screening has been introduced, about one-third
have involved possession of drugs." Dershowitz, Stretching the Fourth Amendment,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1972, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 2, col. 1.
143. Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 170.1-4. Even prior to the issuance of
these regulations, most of the passenger searches were conducted by marshals of the
federal Anti-Hijacking Task Force, composed of Justice Department, Federal Aviation
Administration, and airline industry personnel, or by other law enforcement personnel.
See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson,
454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Lindsey, 451
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
144. Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 121.538, supra note 135.
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position of fines.145 The exclusionary rule should apply whenever search-
es are conducted at the instigation of government authorities or pursuant
to a statutory scheme of enforcement. 14 Thus, even if the entire pre-
boarding screening procedure was carried out by agents of the airlines
or airport officials not formally vested with the police power of the
state, fourth amendment limitations should apply.
Accepting the premise that passenger searches are not merely private
searches, the application of fourth amendment standards must be an-
alyzed in terms of the traditional exceptions to the warrant require-
ment 147 and within the factual contexts of particular intrusions. The
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,48 a case involving a warrant-
less search of an automobile, stated: "The Fourth Amendment does not
denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable." 149
The standard, therefore, is reasonableness; as such, it is not capable of
precise definition.
The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of such a standard,
noting that "there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other
145. The problem facing the airlines is illustrated in the following newspaper account
of a well-publicized incident:
The Federal Aviation Administration is considering levying $1,000 fines
against two airlines that permitted Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) to board
planes without undergoing security screenings .... Hartke refused to go
through security procedures .... Transportation Department officials said
$1,000 fines have been levied against airports and airlines in a few instances
where federal anti-hijacking security rules have been violated.
The Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1973, § A (General News), at 25, col. 1.
Even prior to the adoption of specific regulations, the airlines were under a duty of
reasonable care to assure that firearms were not introduced aboard aircraft. The United
States Code provides: "It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to
transport or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the shipment, transportation or receipt
thereof would be in violation of the provisions of this Chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 922(f)
(1970) (emphasis supplied).
146. One commentator has argued:
The exclusionary rule should apply then in cases where government officials
directly instigate or supervise searches and seizures committed by private
parties for the purpose of acquiring evidence for a criminal prosecution. If
the courts do not apply a rule of exclusion in these cases, government of-
ficials will be permitted to conduct improper searches by simply employing
a private party to commit the physical search.
Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAr. L. REv. 608, 613
(1967) (emphasis supplied).
147. See United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
148. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
149. Id. at 147.
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than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion
which the search (or seizure) entails." 150 Attempting to delineate a more
definite standard, the Court in an earlier case had posited: "The relevant
test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends on
the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case." '1' In
-Chirnel v. California,15 2 however, the Court amended that test, which it
considered to be overly pragmatic and subject to abuse, stating: "Al-
though the recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches depends
upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case, those
facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of established fourth
amendment principles." 11
The facts and circumstances surrounding a particular intrusion are of
prime importance in determining the reasonableness of that intrusion. In
considering the question of reasonableness, the specific factual situation
will provide the necessary basis for balancing the need which compels
the search against the extent of the invasion of individual rights which
such a search entails.' 54 Therefore, in order best to delineate the specific
factors to be recognized in balancing the conflicting interests, airport
passenger searches should be examined in light of their distinctive char-
acteristics.
The passenger search cases have involved two basic types of searches.
In a "selective search," airline or government personnel utilize either
objective 5 or subjective'56 criteria to select from the mass of passengers
150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
151. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
152. 395 US. 752 (1969). The Court, noting that the tests enunciated in RabinouLitz
and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), had been the subject of a great deal of
critical commentary, specifically overruled those decisions insofar as they were incon-
sistent with the test the Court enunciated in Chimel.
153. 395 U.S. at 765.
154. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-537 (1967); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 335
F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
155. The court in United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) de-
scribed the purportedly objective "Federal Aviation Administration System for Dis-
couraging and Apprehending Potential Hijackers.' Briefly, the system provides for:
1. Heavy Penalties.
2. Notice to the Public of the applicable law and penalties, and a notice that pas-
sengers and their baggage are subject to search.
3. Profile based on a compilation of 25 or 30 characteristics which purportedly dis-
tinguish the potential hijacker from the mass of passengers. The court noted that these
,characteristics could be easily observed without exercising judgment.
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boarding an airplane certain persons deemed appropriate to search. The
"mass search" involves varying degrees of intrusion upon the privacy
of each prospective passenger 15 7 and may amount only to a relatively in-
nocuous screening by a metal detection device known as a magnetometer.
Despite the minimal intrusion, at least one court has held the use of such
a device to be a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.1 8
4. Magnetometer-a metal detector device which is set to indicate the presence of
metal of equal or greater amount than that found in an average 25 caliber gun.
5. Interview by airline personnel to determine if an individual selected out, using the
profile and magnetometer, can produce satisfactory identification.
6. Interview by a marshal whereby the individual is asked to identify himself and ex-
plain the magnetometer reading. At this point the "selectee" may be asked to submit
to a "voluntary" search.
7. Fisk. The marshal subjects the selectee to a carefully limited pat down search of
the external clothing to detect the presence of weapons.
156. A passenger's apparent nervousness was deemed sufficient grounds for his selec-
tion for search in United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cit. 1971). There was
testimony that the defendant was "looking about" and perspiring. The court upheld
the validity of the pat down search, stating: "The use of four different names, de-
fendant's extremely anxious behavior and the very hard bulge in the coat pocket pro-
vided a sufficient basis in the context of an airline boarding, to stop defendant and con-
duct a limited pat down. . . . [T]he justifiable bases for the search were largely inde-
pendent of the profile." Id. at 704.
157. Federal Aviation Regulations provide that, "[elach certificate holder shall pre-
pare in writing and submit for approval by the Administrator its security program, in-
cluding the screening system." 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c); 37 Fed. Reg. 4904 (1972). These
regulations further grant to the Administrator the power to amend previously approved
programs if "he determines that safety in air transportation or in air commerce, in the
case of a commercial operator, and the public interest require the amendment." 14
C.F.R. § 121.538(g) (1972). Pursuant to this power, the FAA Administrator recently has
amended those programs to require the following procedures:
The certificate holder shall not permit any passenger to board its aircraft
unless:
A. The carry-on baggage items are inspected to detect weapons, ex-
plosives, or other dangerous objects, and
B. Each passenger is cleared by a detection device without indication of
unaccounted for metal on his/her person..., or
C. In the absence of a detector, each passenger has submitted to a con-
sent search prior to boarding.
Telegram from the Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, to
all FAA Regional Directors for distribution to Certificate Holders, Dec. 5, 1972.
The problems presented by such a mass customs-like search are obvious. The use of
the word "consent" in the provision for a personal search of each passenger evidences
the FAA's concern with the reasonableness of such searches. However, even a pas-
senger's consent in such a situation would not obviate the problems raised by forcing
him to undergo such a procedure insofar as the constitutional right to travel is thereby
impaired.
158. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972). The court stated that by using a magnetometer, "a government officer, without
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Other courts, however, have treated the use of a magnetometer not as a
search, but rather as one step in an investigatory scheme which may pro-
vide the basis for sufficient probable cause to justify a more serious in-
vasion of the right to privacy and the right to travel.159 Regardless of
the degree of intrusion,6 ' an obvious characteristic of a mass search is
the lack of probable cause. Clearly, the sole justification for such in-
trusions is the state interest involved.16'
As a practical matter, warrants cannot be obtained for airport pre-
boarding searches. Although the exigencies of time preclude advance
judicial determination of the reasonableness of the intrusion, 6 2 mass
passenger searches represent precisely the type of general search which
the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.'63 Lack of a warrant,
however, is not always fatal to the lawfulness of a search. The fourth
amendment contains two prohibitions-one relating to the requirements
for a warrant, the other to unreasonable searches and seizures. The im-
portance of this dual protection was noted in Terry v. Ohio,114 in which
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated that "the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
permission, discerned metal on Epperson's person .... Indeed, that is the very purpose
and function of a magnetometer: to search for metal and disclose the presence where
there is a normal expectation of privacy." Id. at 770.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.DN.Y. 1971).
160. A much more serious type of intrusion which recently has been introduced is
the search of all carry-on baggage without any basis of selection. See People v. Smith,
29 Cal. App. 3d 106, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1972).
161. People v. Smith, 29 Cal. App. 3d 106, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1972), represents the
only case that has dealt with many of the issues raised by a customs-type mass search
which is not based upon probable cause.
162. In the context of an airport pre-boarding search, the court in United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (ED.N.Y. 1971), stated that "[n]o warrant was obtained
for the search in this case, nor, as a practical matter could one have been expected....
Exigencies of time precluded the Marshals obtaining a warrant in this situation."
163. The Court in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), noted:
The second clause [of the fourth amendment] declares: "and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." This prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful
bases of fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches.
Since before the creation of our government, such searches have been
deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.
Id. at 357 (emphasis supplied). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
164. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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and seizures through the warrant procedure." 165 Thus, under certain
circumstances, a warrantless search may b'e upheld if it meets the standard
of reasonableness. The general presumption, however, is that warrant-
less searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated ex-
ceptions." 166
Exceptions to the Warrant Requiremem
In the context of airport passenger searches, there are three pertinent
exceptions to the warrant requirement which have received general
recognition by the courts: the existence of probable cause to arrest; con-
sent to the search; and a limited search for weapons. 1 7 A fourth possible
exception which has not yet received widespread judicial recognition
was implied by Chief Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Bell,168 in which he suggested that because of the compelling
necessity for some degree of intrusion, there should be a general lower-
ing of standards in allowing pre-boarding searches. 69 Although it is con-
ceivable that situations may arise in which other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement prove worthwhile, the classic pre-boarding search prob-
ably must be justified under one of the exceptions discussed herein, if it
is to be justified at all.'17
165. Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied). Accord, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
166. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
167. See United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
168. 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1972).
169. This, in effect, is the rationale for allowing general searches without probable
cause by custom officials.
170. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In dealing with
the pre-boarding search in terms of a limited search for weapons and dismissing the
possibility of, a consent search for weapons, the Lopez court stated, in ruling out other
possible exceptions:
The search cannot be justified as one "incident" to an arrest .... [A]rrests
were not made until after the frisk had been completed and the contraband
seized.. . . [Tihere is no evidence of "hot pursuit" . . . or danger of im-
minent destruction of any known evidence .... No apparent offense was
observed being committed in the presence of these officers which would
have justified the search .... The contraband was certainly not in "plain
view". . . . Thus, the only exception to the warrant rule under which the
search of this defendant can be justified is the protective "frisk" for weapons
authorized by Terry v. Ohio.
Id. at 1093.
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Probable Cause for Arrest: Search Incident to Arrest
The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, in a general discussion
of the fourth amendment, noted: "When a man is legally arrested for
an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is
unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense
may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution." Mu In Chimel v.
California, the Court stated: "There is ample justification... for a search
of the arresree's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-con-
struing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 112 Thus, it is clear
that the Court has approved the principle yet carefully limited the scope
of the contemporaneous search exception. Consistent with sound judicial
policy, the intrusion allowed is no greater than that necessary to make
an effective arrest. Obviously, then, in order for the exception to apply
in the airport situation, the search must occur within the penumbra of a
lawful arrest. It is interesting to note that the contemporaneous search
in Cbimel apparently lacked that ingredient, for the search took place
in the context of an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant. The Supreme
Court, however, accepted for the purposes of its decision the California
Supreme Court's holding that the arrest was nonetheless valid "since the
arresting officers had procured the warrant 'in good faith', and since in
any event they had sufficient information to constitute probable cause
for the petitioner's arrest." 173 Absent a warrant, then, the initial arrest
must be based upon reasonable grounds or probable cause in order for the
contemporaneous search exception to apply.174
171. 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). Carroll dealt with the question whether there was prob-
able cause to believe a vehicle was carrying contraband rather than with a contempor-
aneous search. However, the principle there enunciated is applicable to the contempor-
aneous search exception to the warrant requirement.
172. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The principle announced in Chimel had previously been
elaborated by the Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which held
inadmissible evidence obtained in a warrantless search of defendant's car, which was in
police custody after defendant's arrest. The Court in Preston outlined the scope of
contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest, stating that such searches are
justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the weapons or evidence
is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are
absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest' Id. at 367.
173. 395 U.S. at 754 (emphasis supplied).
174. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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What constitutes probable cause in a given situation eludes exact
definition. Courts appear to be willing to alter the meaning of either
term in order to accommodate competing interests. In Locke v. United
States, John Marshall defined "probable cause" as meaning something
"less than evidence which would justify condemnation.... It imports a
seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion." 175 The
Court has long since departed from that standard, and it is clear that
"probable cause" has come to mean more than bare suspicion. There have
been numerous attempts by the Court to draw a definitional line be-
tween mere suspicion and probable cause. In Brinnegar v. United
States,176 for example, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated: "Probable cause ex-
ists where 'the facts and circumstances within... [the officers'] knowl-
edge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the be-
lief that' an offense has been or is being committed." 177
Apparently, then, probable cause lies in a twilight zone between proof
sufficient to convict and facts which give rise to mere suspicion. A fed-
eral district court has described this gray area in the following terms:
Implied in such terms as "probable cause" or "reasonableness" is a
continuum of probability that the subject has been, is, or is about
to be, engaged in criminal activity; it begins with no evidence of
such conduct and extends to almost certainty. Ranked along this
continuum are various degrees of probability justifying different
types of intrusion upon the privacy of the individual....
An investigative "stop" requires one degree of probability, while
a "frisk" in many cases requires a higher level. At other points on
the scale are levels of probability justifying the various exigent cir-
cumstance intrusions typified by border searches, automobile
searches, those occasioned by hot pursuit and the like. Finally at
the practical end of the continuum we find the classic "probable
cause" levels which will justify the issuance of search warrants,
and searches incidental to arrest with or without a warrant.178
In applying this "continuum theory" to the degrees of cause involved
in airport searches, it is obvious that there is no probable cause, as such,
175. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
176. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
177. Id. at 175-76, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
178. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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involved in the initial intrusions. Mass searches are not purported to be
made pursuant to a particularized cause. Justification is urged solely in
terms of the public interest in controlling what passengers may bring
onto an airplane. In each instance there is only a very slight possibility
that any given passenger may have a weapon; yet, it is this possibility
which is deemed sufficient to justify a search. The degree of cause is not
much higher in a selective search based upon a superficial and often
quite subjective procedure. Indeed, it may be argued that there is no
greater an invasion of personal liberties where a search is made indis-
criminately of each passenger with no probable cause than where a
search is made of selected individuals based upon the modicum of cause
supplied by such criteria. It is, therefore, difficult to find that probable
cause for arrest or search exists in the typical pre-boarding search situa-
tion.
Moreover, the pre-boarding search cannot be justified as a search in-
cident to a lawful arrest because the subject is not under arrest when
such searches occur; although he clearly is not free to leave, it cannot be
said that a formal arrest has been made .' 9 The Supreme Court has noted
that "[i] t is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest
and serve as part of its justification." 180 The contemporaneous search
exception to the warrant requirement, therefore, does not pertain to the
initial intrusion in most airline searches, and little attempt has been made
to so argue.
Finding that the initial intrusion cannot be justified as a contempor-
aneous search, however, does not end the applicability of that doctrine
to airport pre-boarding searches. If the "stop and frisk" exception to the
warrant requirement announced in Terry v. Ohia'81 is used as justifica-
tion for the initial intrusion,'182 a greater degree of flexibility, vis-a-vis
the grounds for that intrusion, is provided. However, the scope of such
a search is extremely limited. 8 Thus, in the area of selective searches,
179. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United
.States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
180. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968). See Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948).
181. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
182. The Court in Terry held that in "appropriate circumstances" a police officer
may make an investigatory stop of an individual "for the purpose of investigating pos-
sible criminal behavior" and conduct a carefully limited protective pat-down search
for weapons prior to finding any probable cause for arrest. 392 U.S. at 22, 27. See notes
236-61 infra & accompanying text.
183. See notes 24447 infra & accompanying text.
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conformity to the hijacker profile and a positive magnetometer reading
may provide sufficient grounds to stop the individual and request identi-
fication.8 4 This interview may, in turn, provide a basis for a properly
circumscribed pat-down search." 5 The result, therefore, is a pyramid
of progressively more serious intrusions, each lesser intrusion providing
some objective basis for one more serious." 6
This progressive series of intrusions is the essence of the federal high-
jack program. As has been noted: "The program is designed to speed
passengers who are unlikely to present danger and to isolate, with the
least possible discomfiture or delay, those presenting a substantial pos-
sibility of danger. At each successive screening stage an attempt is made
to permit as many as possible to complete boarding." 187 While expedi-
ency is never a justification for unwarranted intrusions upon fundamen-
tal rights, proper application of this program has been upheld by most
courts. Whether strict adherence to FAA guidelines will be required
may depend upon the balance a particular court strikes between the
competing interests. 88 In any event, however, if the initial limited search
is upheld as constitutional, the contemporaneous search exception may
provide an important after-the-fact justification for a more thorough
search once an arrest has been made.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (ED.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Muelener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (CD. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
185. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez, 328
F. Supp. 1077 (ED.N.Y. 1971). Comra, United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (NID.
Cal. 1972); United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
186. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972). The court held that con-
formance to the hijacker profile and a positive magnetometer reading, indicating
the presence of a considerable amount of metal on the person of a prospective pas-
senger, justified the marshal in stopping that passenger and requesting identification.
Failure to produce any identification, plus the other factors already mentioned, justified
a protective pat down search. The results of the pat down search provided sufficient
probable cause for arrest and a more thorough search incident to arrest. In United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972), arising in an almost identical situation,
the court held that the same facts justified a search of defendant's carry-on baggage after
the protective pat-down search failed to produce any weapons or explosives.
187. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (ED.N.Y. 1971).
188. In United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (CD. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972), one
of the two independent grounds for excluding the evidence seized in the search of the
passengers was the overly broad scope of the initial search. In United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the evidence uncovered in the search was
suppressed because the initial search was grounded on a profile that had been updated
in a manner which raised equal protection problems as well as questions as to its ob-
jectivity.
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Consent
Once constitutional analysis is brought to bear on the airport search
situation, the determinative issue often may be that of consent. In this
context, "consent" amounts to a waiver of the fundamental right to
privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment. The classic definition of
waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." 189 One problem therefore presented is whether con-
sent may be inferred from the actions of a passenger who continues the
boarding process after he passes conspicuously posted signs stating that
all passengers and baggage are subject to search.
Two federal district courts have dealt with this issue recently. In
United States v. Lopez, 9' the theory that consent could be implied on
such grounds was rejected explicitly. The court felt that consent must
be express. It was reasoned that since a passenger is not free to leave
the boarding area after an initial confrontation with searching authorities,
consent to the search could not be characterized as voluntary or express.
Even if it was voluntary, the court reasoned that such consent was an
unconstitutional condition on the right to travel. Similarly, in United
States v. Allen, it was noted that "any doctrine of 'implied consent'
would be at odds with the strict standards of waiver 'enunciated by the
Supreme Court." 191
In Lopez and Allen, a waiver of the right to privacy was sought to
b'e implied from passenger conduct. This implication is at odds with the
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bumper v. North Carolina:
"When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawful-
ness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in
fact, freely and voluntarily given." 192 The consent in Bumper was
acquiescence by the petitioner to a search of his home. Presumably, in-
dividuals in their homes are more conscious of their right to privacy than
are passengers boarding at an airport flight gate. 93 Therefore, it seems
that the Bumper standard should be modified accordingly.
189. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
190. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
191. 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The court in Allen, however, held that
consent could be imposed as a condition to boarding the aircraft.
192. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
193. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-50 (1966), the Supreme Court noted
that an individual is likely to be more acutely aware of a right of privacy while at home
than under other circumstances-in that case in a prosecutor's office.
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A collateral issue is raised by a passenger's acquiescence to demands
that he consent to a search once he has been selected for closer scrutiny.
The Court in Bumper noted that the prosecutor's burden of showing
that consent was given freely and voluntarily "cannot be discharged by
showing [mere] acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." 14 This
holding has found considerable support in the airport search cases that
have dealt with the issue. Once the person is no longer free to leave,
consent to a search is inherently coercive. 195 Whether a full 'explanation
of rights similar to the warning required under Miranda v. Arizona'96 is
required in order to avoid the taint of coercion is problematic. It is cer-
tain that under Johnson v. Zerbst a waiver must be knowledgeable. It is
also logical to assume that a waiver of fourth amendment rights must be
examined in that light. The court in United States v. Blalock shed some
light on this issue, stating: "The Fourth Amendment requires no less
knowing a waiver than do the Fifth and Sixth. The requirement of
knowledge in each serves... to prevent the possibility that the ignorant
may surrender their rights more readily than the shrewd." 197 Therefore,
a "Miranda-type" warning might provide the individual with sufficient
knowledge to constitute an effective waiver.198 Moreover, by assuring
the individual that the authorities are willing to accept a refusal to waive,
the warning would tend to dispel the atmosphere of coercion. 9 It should
be noted, however, that such warnings would be meaningless unless the
passengers also were given an option to leave the area.
It is clear that consent by mere acquiescence or implication is con-
trary to the overwhelming weight of authority. Such circumstances
should not be said to give rise to a waiver of constitutional freedoms. It
194. 391 U.S. at 548-49.
195. In United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the defendant's
consent to an airport search was obtained at a time when he believed his only options
were to open his suitcase or be arrested. The court held that such "consent did not
constitute an 'intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right' to refuse to open the
bag in the absence of a search warrant." Id. at 752. In a similar case, United States v.
Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972), it was held: "It is clear that
in the instant case, the defendant did not give consent to a search of his suitcase. He
opened it only after he was ordered to do so by the marshal at a time when he was not
fxee to leave or to avoid the search. Under such circumstances the search was inherently
coercive." Id. at 6.
196. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
197. 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
198. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
199. It is doubtful, however, whether many individuals could fully comprehend all
the legal consequences of a waiver.
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is for precisely this reason that in those few cases where the issue was
raised, the doctrine of implied consent has been rejected.2°0 However,
very few cases dealing with the pre-boarding search have considered
consent a determinative factor. In at least three cases where the issue was
considered tangentially, consent obtained at the boarding gate was not
found to be inherently coercive.21
Assuming that in an advanced society air travel may be the only ef-
fective means of exercising the right to travel in certain circumstances,
any limitation placed on that right is seemingly coercive. The issue there-
fore raised is whether the exercise of one constitutional right ever can
be conditioned on the relinquishment of another constitutional right.
This is precisely the problem presented in the "express consent" situation.
Recendy three district courts in United States v. Lopez, 2°2 United States
v. Meulener,213 and United States v. Allen2°4 have considered the rami-
fications of an express consent to a pre-flight search, and in so doing
have developed divergent approaches to the question.
In each case, the first problem considered was whether the consent
which was given expressly could be held to be an effective waiver of a
constitutional right. The determinative factor in all three cases was
whether the individual had a right to refuse to waive, and hence free-
dom to leave. The court in Allen noted that "in order to be a valid
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights a passenger must b-e aware of his
option to avoid the search by not boarding." 20 5 The court in Meulener
emphasized this point by stating that the passenger must be advised of
his right to avoid the search by declining to board the airplane.2 6 These
cases, however, did differ in one important aspect. The Allen court as-
serted that it had "no doubt" that airline authorities have an absolute
200. See note 195 supra.
201. The district court decision in United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) indicated that the airport frisk could have been
upheld on the grounds of consent; however, the court preferred to base its opinion on
the premise that sufficient grounds existed for a protective frisk. A California court of
appeals in People v. De Strulle, 28 Cal. App. 3d 477, 104 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1972) held that
the issue of whether a search at a boarding ramp was voluntary was a question of fact.
The court also held that it was not necessary to advise a passenger of his Miranda rights
before seeking a waiver of his right to privacy. See People v. Smith, 29 Cal. App. 3d
106, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1972).
202. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
203. Crim. No. 10931-CD (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
204. 349 F. Supp. 749 (NJD. Cal. 1972).
205. Id. at 752.
206. Crim. No. 10931-CD, 10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972):
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right to require a passenger to submit to a search of his person and bag-
gage as a condition to boarding the aircraft. 20 7 Lopez and Meulener in-
dicated, on the other hand, that the government cannot "condition the
exercise of the defendant's constitutional right to travel on the voluntary
relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights." 208
Arguably, the Lopez rationale is correct in a constitutional sense. As-
suming, however, that the legislative enactment of the "anti-hijacking"
statute evidences a compelling state interest, the problem becomes clear-
under what circumstances is there sufficient basis to require a relinquish-
ment of one's fourth amendment rights in order to exercise one's right
to travel? The court in Meulener reached this issue tangentially in hold-
ing that "[t] he mere fact of meeting the profile and activating the mag-
netometer does not establish grounds for a forced search." 209 The Allen
court seemingly concurred, stating that the selection of a passenger using
the criteria developed in the anti-hijacking screening system does not
alone constitute cause for a personal or baggage search. Both courts, how-
ever, did feel that a person conforming to the potential hijacker profile,
having a positive magnetometer reading, and failing to produce adequate
identification or to explain the magnetometer reading, could be denied
passage unless he expressly waived his fourth amendment rights and sub-
mitted to a search. Although the objective facts generated by the selection
process did not constitute sufficient probable cause to overcome fourth
amendment rights in either Allen or Meulener, they did constitute suf-
ficient cause to condition the right to travel on a waiver of those rights.
Although Meulener agreed in principle with the rationale of Lopez-
that the exercise of the right of travel cannot be conditioned upon the
waiver of other fundamental rights-it recognized the need to balance
those rights against a compelling state interest. The result was to con-
dition the right to travel only where the degree of probability would be
sufficient to justify a protective search. 210 Thus, although Lopez never
considered consent in determining the reasonableness of the search while
Meulener seemingly concerned itself solely with that issue, the manner
in which the two courts were able to reach the same result is readily
apparent. Allen, on the other hand, seemingly refused to balance the
respective interests, deeming the right to condition an individual's free-
207. 349 F. Supp. at 752 (dictum).
208. United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD, 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972),
citing United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
209. Crim. No. 10931-CD, 10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972).
210. See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
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dom of travel as absolute. Arguably, the state interest should not be con-
sidered so compelling.
The FAA now requires either a magnetometer search or "consent"
frisk of each passenger as well as a search of all carry-on luggage before
any passenger may board an airplane. Despite the Supreme Court's state-
ment that the fourth amendment protects people, and not simply areas,211
the use of the magnetometer appears to have won judicial approval. In
Epperson v. United States,212 for example, the court conceded that scan-
ning by use of a magnetometer was a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. However, following what it believed to be the ex-
ception suggested by the Supreme Court in Terry, the court balanced
the minimal degree of intrusion against the overwhelming national in-
terest in favor of such searches and decided that the warrant requirement
was excused by "exigent national circumstances." 2 13 By balancing the
respective interests, the court in United States v. Slocum also found the
magnetometer search justified, stating:
Reasonableness is the ultimate standard. And, we conclude that
within the context of a potential hijacking the necessarily limited
"search" accomplished by use of the magnetometer per se is justi-
fled by a reasonable governmental interest in protecting national
air commerce.... [Elmployment of the magnetometer does not
violate the 4th Amendment.214
Consent, then, may not be an essential element in magnetometer searches.
Although wholesale use of the magnetometer appears to have met
with easy acceptance, justification for the search of all carry-on luggage
211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the Court held:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall
of the booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id.
212. 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
213. Id. at 771. Accord, United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972).
214. 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972). Contra, United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077, 1100 (ED!N.Y. 1971). In Lopez, the court expressed doubts about the reasonable-
ness of the use of the magnetometer on all passengers where such use is not based upon
an application of the profile to determine which passenger's magnetometer reading should
be monitored.
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presents a more difficult problem. It must be determined whether, even
in light of the degree of national interest involved, these searches should
be grounded on an express consent guaranteed by an absolute right to
leave. Moreover, it is necessary to determine the constitutionality of the
option to leave as the sole alternative to a search.
The Supreme Court has stated that the fourth amendment "does not
denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable." 215
Thus, it is clear that the mandates of the fourth amendment are not ab-
solute. A determination of what is reasonable necessarily involves a bal-
ancing of individual interests against those of the state. The state interest
in providing for airport passenger searches ostensibly is the prevention
of airplane hijackings and the detection of possible hijackers. In order
to provide such protection, the FAA has determined that all carry-on
luggage of each passenger must be searched. Since an FAA determina-
tion, however, does not alone validate an otherwise unreasonable search,
the courts have sought objective criteria upon which to determine "rea-
sonableness."
The court in United States v. Lopez, 216 for 'example, attempted the
seemingly impossible task of determining the degree of threat posed by
each boarding passenger. By examining available statistics,21 the court
concluded that one out of 15, or approximately six percent, of the pas-
sengers selected to be searched after the screening procedure could be
expected to have a weapon on his person. It was therefore held that a
six percent "danger of arms" in the context of a potential hijacking
justified a protective frisk.218 Apparently aware of the possible ramifi-
cations of its decision, however, the Lopez court carefully limited its
holding, noting:
215. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
216. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
217. One sample was based on a universe of 500,000 boarding passengers, of which
99.86 percent boarded without ever being asked a question and 99.95 percent boarded
without a search. Only 16 of, the 283 persons selected to be searched by the use of the
screening system were arrested. Thus, .0032 percent of the total flight population were
found to be carrying some form of contraband. A second sample, determined by the
average monthly use of John F. Kennedy International Airport, had a universe of
441,000 prospective passengers. Nine persons or .00204 percent of the universe, were
arrested out of a group of 303 who reportedly met the "profile" and were searched. 328
F. Supp. at 1084.
218. Two other cases have held that this level of probability only justified making
a search a precondition to boarding. United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931-CD
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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Mere statistical information as that generated in this case does not,
by itself, justify "frisks." If, for example, reliable statistics were
available that in a given community one person in fifteen (6%)
regularly carried concealed weapons, the police would not be
justified in arbitrarily stopping and frisking anyone on the street.
, The Court is charged with the duty of balancing the competing
interests of the individual and the society in each case presented.
No single figure can provide a test for constitutional legitimacy.219
Assuming arguendo that there is a .003 percent chance of finding a
weapon on any given passenger, a search of every passenger can hard-
ly be justified on the basis that a reasonable threat is posed by a particular
individual.2 0 Even accepting the premise that a percentile determination
of probability may provide sufficient grounds for an invasion of a con-
stitutional right, a mere .003 possibility does not appear sufficient to con-
dition the right to travel on the relinquishment of fourth amendment
rights. Only on the basis of the incredible threat to life and property
posed by that .003 percent, and the minimal degree of resentment aroused
by such intrusions, could a mass search be considered reasonable.
A possible justification for the mass airport search may lie in cases
which have upheld various administrative searches. An "administrative
search" is one made in the public interest and, hence, justifiably held to
a lower fourth amendment standard. There are striking parallels between
this type of search and the pre-flight boarding search; both are conducted
without express consent, probable cause, or a warrant. By indicating
that an administrative search is held to a lower standard, it is not to be
inferred that these searches are -entirely immune from fourth amendment
limitations. In fact, only in very limited circumstances have such search-
es been upheld. Those instances, however, typically involve many of
the same considerations that exist with respect to an airline mass search.
One such circumstance has arisen in the context of quarantine enforce-
ment. In United States v. Scbafer, 2 21 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to narcotics un-
219. 328 F. Supp. at 1097-98.
220. The Supreme Court in Terry remarked that "the degree of community resent-
ment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality
of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security caused by those
practices." 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968). Thus, community standards as to expectation of
privacy are highly relevant in balancing the degree of intrusion against the govern-
ment interest involved.
221. 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972).
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covered in a warrantless search of passenger luggage made pursuant to
an order of the Secretary of Agriculture as authorized by the Plant
Quarantine Act.222
The search in Schafer-which appears to be similar to that authorized
by the Federal Aviation Regulations 223-was upheld because of the valid
public interest concerned, because procurement of a warrant was not
feasible, and because "a quarantine inspection is not a search 'which has
as its design the securing of information... which may be used to effect
a further deprivation of life, liberty or property.' "224 Apparently, this
holding was based on the premise that the "'criminal' standard of prob-
able cause would not be imposed upon administrative inspections," al-
though a warrant would be required where its procurement was feasi-
ble.225 Although it may be argued that the public interest in enforcing
a quarantine is less significant than the prevention of hijacking, it is crim-
inal conduct at which an anti-hijacking search is aimed. Therefore, the
legality of such a search should not be based on a premise that the crim-
inal standard of "probable cause" would not be imposed.
In another area of administrative searches, the Supreme Court has held
that the warrantless inspection of the business premise of a federally
licensed dealer in firearms, pursuant to the need to regulate the traffic
in arms, was permissible. 226 The Court found exigent circumstances and
substantial government interest in such regulatory inspections. Although
the sanctions involved were criminal, this case also may be distinguished
from the typical airline search. There is an obvious difference between
one who procures a federal license to engage in arms dealing-an activity
involving a high degree of government interest and a broad scheme of
regulation-and one who merely chooses to exercise his constitutional
right to travel. Arguably, the arms dealer has focused the attention of
the government on his activities by his own deliberate actions. In effect,
he may b'e said to have "consented" to a search. Thus, although the ad-
ministrative search cases may appear to provide justification for a lower-
ing of fourth amendment standards in the airline search situation, there
are certain critical differences, either in the nature of the search or in the
class of persons to be searched, between the two situations. Hence, the
222. Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. S 161 (1970).
223. See note 135 supra & accompanying text.
224. 461 F.2d at 859, citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
225. 461 F.2d at 858-59, citing Camara v. Municipal Ct., 383 U.S. 523, 1535 (1967).
226. United States v. Biswell, 92 S. Ct. 1593 (1972).
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administrative search cases hold little precedential value for warrantless
airport searches.
If, then, it is determined that there is no justification for conducting
a warrantless search of carry-on luggage without obtaining the passen-
ger's consent, it is necessary to determine the constitutionality of leaving
the passenger with the sole option of not boarding should he refuse such
consent. The Court in Allen seemed to indicate an absolute right in the
airline authorities to condition boarding upon express consent to a
search.22 7 The Lopez and Meulener decisions, however, adhered to an
opposite point of view, indicating that since denial of airline transporta-
tion frequently is tantamount to a frustration of the right to travel, con-
sent obtained under such conditions is inherently coercive, thus vitiating
the constitutional effectiveness of the waiver.228 In United States v. lack-
son,229 however, the Supreme Court held that a "procedure need not be
inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible
burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right" 2 0 and that a meere
"chilling effect" on the assertion of a constitutional right could be suffi-
cient to invalidate a provision of law if that provision had no other pur-
pose or effect. 81
Although the prevention of hijacking represents a substantial govern-
ment interest, the existence of this interest should not authorize a prac-
tice which curtails basic freedoms where the means chosen to effect that
end are imprecise. In this regard, the mass search situation may be an-
alogized to the situation in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,2 2 where the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an act which made it unlawful for
any registered member of a Communist organization to apply for or
use a passport. The Court in Aptbeker reasoned that the provision was
unconstitutional on its face, because of its broad and indiscriminate trans-
gression of first amendment liberties. Similarly, imposing conditions upon
the right to travel raises important due process problems. In Keint v. Dul-
227. See note 207 supra & accompanying text. In a concurring opinion in United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972), Chief Judge Friendly stated that a mass
search of all passengers without their consent was justified in light of the hijacldng
emergency. He noted that, assuming the passengers have advance notice of the search
procedures, they could avoid such search simply by choosing not to travel by air.
228. See note 208 supra & accompanying text.
229. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
230. Id. at 583.
231. Id. at 581.
232. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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les, another passport case, the Court held that the "right to travel is a
part-of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment." 233 The freedom of move-
ment may be limited by a narrowly drawn statute or regulation serving
a compelling government interest;23 4 however, imposition of a general
condition upon the right to travel cannot be sustained. Thus, there are
compelling reasons for holding unconstitutional any requirement of a
voluntary waiver of fourth amendment rights as a condition of travel.
This approach affords the individual at least a modicum of protection
while allowing other means for achieving the government's valid inter-
est. Allen and Meulener, for example, indicated that when a certain level
of probable cause was reached, the right to travel could be conditioned
on consent to a search. Although this level of cause might not be as
high as that traditionally required for encroachments upon fourth amend-
inent rights, it is submitted that the harm to the integrity of fourth
amendment standards resulting from current practices in the nation's
airports could be reduced through implementation of this approach.
Another approach was suggested by Lopez, Bell, and Epperson-the
use of a selective search based upon minimal grounds uncovered during
the preflight screening process. This procedure, however, might have
a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to travel, since, once a selec-
tion is made, the individual apparently would have no right to leave.
Searches secured by "enforced consent" are far from consistent with
the right to travel freely. "In such a case the citizen who has given no
good cause for a belief that he is engaged in [criminal activity] ought
to be able to proceed on his way without interference." 23 Despite a com-
pelling government interest, the threat posed by any single passenger cer-
tainly does not justify a search of all carry-on luggage. The most attrac-
tive solution appears to be one that would allow passengers to check
baggage which they do not want searched, rather than the present pro-
gram, which effectively conditions the right to travel upon submission
to a search.
233. 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). The Court continued: "Freedom of movement across
frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage....
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values." Id.
234. The Supreme Court has stated that "any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise [of the right to travel within the United States], unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
235. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949).
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Protective Frisk
In most airport search cases, the search of prospective passengers based
upon some form of selective criteria has been justified as a protective
pat-down search, a procedure approved by the Supreme Court in Terry
v. Ohio.216 In order to uphold this intrusion, however, the courts have
had to depart from the limited nature of the holdings in Terry and its
companion case, Sibron v. New York. 21 7 Moreover, in two cases, the
protective frisk rationale has been found inapplicable to the procedures
now used to ferret out potential hijackers.2 18
The Court in Terry held that a pat-down search, to be reasonable,
must have been justifiable at its inception. Moreover, the scope of the
ultimate action must be reasonably related to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.219 Thus, the extent of intru-
sion must be related to the cause of the intrusion. The grounds necessary
to justify a carefully limited protective frisk are not as strict as those
required for probable cause to arrest. The "probability of guilt" neces-
sary for arrest is inapplicable to stop and frisk situations, where only a
"probability of impending criminal activity" is necessary.240 To justify
a protective frisk, the police officer must have "reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime." 241
Thus, the search must be motivated by self-protection or protection of
others and must be based upon "rational inferences" drawn from "ar-
ticulable facts." 242 Where an individual is engaged in suspicious be-
havior, a police officer may investigat6 and, when the facts and circum-
stances warrant, take certain protective action. The applicable test has
been characterized as one of "substantial possibility." 243
236. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
237. 392 US. 40 (1968).
238. The courts in Meulener and Allen held that the Terry standards had not been
met in the passenger searches involved in those cases and that consent was a necessary
prerequisite to a pre-boarding search which was based on no more than a positive
magnetometer reading, a fitting of the profile, and a failure to produce adequate identifi-
cation. See note 209 supra & accompanying text.
239. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
240. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 184 (1968).
241. 392 U.S. at 27. The Court in Terry continued: "The officer need not be ab-
solutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger." Id.
242. Id. at 21.
243. LaFare, Street Encounter and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MicH. L. REv. 40, 87 (1968).
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The Court in Terry carefully limited the scope of a permissible pro-
tective frisk. Since such a search is intended to protect the police officer
and others by allowing reasonable methods based upon standards lower
than normally are tolerated when fourth amendment rights are endan-
gered, the permissible intrusion is "a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing.., in an attempt to discover weapons .... ,, 244 The ad-
mission of the seized evidence in Terry thus was justified by the high
degree of interest in allowing reasonable criminal investigation with some
margin of safety for the investigators and by the limited nature of the
intrusion.
The limited nature of the protective frisk exception to the warrant
requirement was underscored in Sibron v. New York,245 in which evi-
dence uncovered in circumstances similar to those in Terry was held in-
admissible because the search was motivated by a desire to seize drugs
rather than a need for self-protection. Moreover, Terry upheld the ad-
mission into evidence of weapons seized in a protective frisk but did not
consider the admissibility of contraband other than weapons seized un-
der similar circumstances. At least one commentator has suggested that
the protective frisk exception should apply only to hidden weapons, in
order to eliminate any temptation to abuse the exception by a general
search for contraband.2 46 Although this proposal would foreclose many
of the doubts concerning the use of the Terry exception in airport
search cases, it has not gained judicial acceptance. In Peters v. New
York, 2 47 a companion case to Terry and Sibron, contraband other than
weapons was held admissible where it was discovered in a valid weapons
frisk and could have been mistaken for a weapon. The Court in Peters
and Terry distinguished the situation in Sibron b'ecause in that case, the
scope of the intrusion was not properly circumscribed. The police officer
obviously was looking for narcotics and the search did not begin with
a weapons frisk which might have justified further intrusion.
In light of the limitations on the purpose and nature of a protective
frisk, the exclusion of all evidence except weapons would not be war-
ranted. However, in the special context of airport searches, where the
level of cause for protective search is lower than in street encounters, a
rule limiting admissibility to concealed weapons only is justified and
may represent an effective balance of the conflicting interests involved.
244. 392 U.S. at 30.
245. 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
246. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 240, at 185.
247. 392 U.S. 40 (1967).
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There has been considerable disagreement among the courts in the
application of the protective frisk exception to airport passenger searches.
This divergence would appear to result from differing assessments of
similar factual situations. For example, the courts are unable to agree on
the reasonable implications to be drawn where a passenger fits the hi-
jacker profile, yields a positive magnetometer reading, and fails to pro-
duce adequate identification.2 48 Assuming a proper application of the
"profile," the courts in both Lopez and Bell would uphold "a narrow-
ly circumscribed protective weapons 'pat-down' or 'frisk' . ..of the
limited number of passengers who fit all three criteria." 249 Both courts
were reluctant to extend the Terry rationale; nevertheless, they were
persuaded that the highly objective nature of the FAA selection process
would provide sufficient protection against subjective whim or caprice
of enforcement personnel. This rationale, however, has not been adopted
unanimously by the courts dealing with the problem; as noted above,
the Meulener and Allen courts did not feel that the selection of a pas-
senger via the use of the screening system was sufficient to justify a
forced search. Assuming, arguendo, that the figures in Lopez are valid,
the difference between these two views is their divergent evaluation of
the six percent mathematical probability that a passenger might be
armed.250 The Meulener and Allen evaluation is based on the premise that
mere objectivity of selection and a percentage chance of criminal activity
do not justify an invasion of fourth amendment rights. It does, however,
justify a qualification to the right to travel. At the other end of the
248. Samples introduced in United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084, 1086
(ED.N.Y. 1971), indicated that 90 percent of potential hijackers fit the profile as com-
pared to less than one percent of the total traveling public. Of, the total number of pas-
sengers, approximately .14 percent fit the profile as well as activated the magnetometer.
Out of the total number of passengers, .05 percent fit all three criteria necessary for a
search.
249. Id. at 1097. The court's refusal to consider such evidence in Lopez was based
upon an improper application of the FAA profile. The airline in that case had "Updated"
the profile by adding two characteristics (one of which was based on an ethnic ele-
ment) and deleting what the court considered to be an essential element of the scien-
tifically supported profile. The court rejected the evidence because the addition of the
ethnic element created equal protection problems, and the total effect of the changes
was to eliminate the "objectively neutral" character of the profile and make its applica-
tion dependent on subjective judgment. Id. at 1101. The court felt that there were dis-
quieting implications in the use of statistical probability as an element of probable cause
or even of substantial possibility. While it felt that the use of mathematical probability
might be necessary in this area, it wish6d to underscore the judicial role in policing
both the methods employed and the scope of their application.
250. See notes 216-18 supra & accompanying text.
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spectrum, the court in Slocum found that the degree of probability avail-
able in these circumstances justifies not only a limited search of the pas-
senger's person but also a full-blown search of his carry-on luggage.
However, Slocum did not attempt to justify this search under the Terry
exception. Rather, the court relied on the reasonable governmental in-
terest involved.251
Arguably, the use of objective standards to select persons for a limited
search-where it can be shown mathematically that there is a six percent
chance that they are armed-is within the spirit of the protective frisk
exception. At least this is true in the context of the compelling need to
halt aircraft hijacking. However, the courts in People v. Smit 25 2 and
in Epperson have stretched the protective frisk exception in this area
beyond the limit of its reasonable interpretation. Epperson upheld the
admission of evidence seized in a limited protective airport frisk which
was conducted solely on the basis of an unexplained positive magnet-
ometer reading. The magnetometer, it should be noted, shows a positive
reading for about 50 percent of the persons who pass through its sensory
area.253 The district court decision in Bell indicated that it would have
serious reservations about judicial acquiescence to a protective frisk
based solely on such grounds.254 However, Epperson held that the pres-
ence of unexplained metal on the person of a passenger sufficient in mass
or quantity to register an abnormally high magnetometer reading was
sufficient to warrant the belief of a reasonably prudent man that his life,
or the lives of others, were in danger. 55
The Smith court felt that a similar inference could be drawn where a
person attempts to leave the boarding area after an announcement that
all carry-on luggage would be inspected.25 6 This holding directly con-
tradicts the holdings in Meulener, Allen, and Lopez, where the right to
leave was held to b'e an essential element of consent and where the high
degree of government interest was held not to attach to the search of a
person who chose not to board the airplane. The Smith holding-that a
reasonable inference could b'e drawn from a desire not to be searched-
raises grave constitutional problems, since the desire to exercise a con-
stitutional right should not constitute grounds for an invasion of that
251. 464 F.2d at 1183.
252. 29 Cal. App. 3d 106, 105 Cal. Rprr. 280 (1972).
253. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
254. 335 F. Supp. at 802.
255. 454 F.2d at 771.
256. 29 Cal. App. 3d 106, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1972).
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right. However, the Smith court, unlike the Meulener court, felt that
under such circumstances the compelling government interest in the
search did not end when a person chose not to take a flight.2 57
Finally, the court in United States v. Lindsey258 proposed that the
lower standards for a limited search approved in Terry be lowered still
further to accommodate the anti-hijacking program. The court stated
that:
In the context of a possible airplane hijacking with the enormous
consequences which may flow therefrom, and in view of the lim-
ited time in which [the Marshal] had to act, the level of suspicion
required for a Terry investigative stop and protective search should
be lowered. Therefore, despite the fact that it may be said that
the level of suspicion present in the instant case is lower than in
Terry, it was sufficiently high to justify [the Marshal's] acting. 59
The basis for the search in Lindsey was the boarding passenger's "general
indicia of extreme anxiety," his failure to produce adequate identification,
and bulges in his pockets .26  The bulges proved to be narcotics.
The view that the Terry standards should be lowered in this context
was shared by Chief Judge Friendly in the court of appeals decision in
Bell. In a concurring opinion, Judge Friendly endorsed a broad-based
search of all airline passengers, irrespective of whether such passengers
conform to the "hijacker profile" or other objective criteria. He noted
that air piracy had reached such dangerous proportions that the only
limitation on airline searches should be that they be conducted in good
faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking. In this regard, he added:
"I would thus have no difficulty in sustaining a search that was based
on nothing more than the trained intuition of an airline ticket agent or a
marshal of the Anti-Hijacking Task Force..." 281
CONCLUSION
In an area of complex balancing of three critical interests-the right
to privacy, the freedom to travel, and the interest in ending air piracy-
there are no easy answers. The Meulener court has suggested one solu-
257. 105 Cal. Rpr. at 283.
258. 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
259. Id. at 703.
260. Id.
261. 464 F.2d at 675.
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tion that seems to accommodate all three interests most effectively. Un-
doubtedly, some degree of intrusion upon the right to privacy and the
right to travel will be upheld in this area, due to the compelling govern-
ment interest and the difficulty of serving that interest without imposing
on the rights of air travelers. Under Meulener, the right to travel re-
mains protected until some basis is established for limiting such right;
then and only then may that right be conditioned. The right to privacy
is protected by providing for an absolute right to leave when a passenger
is confronted with a search as a condition to his boarding the airplane.
Neither right can be infringed under Meulener without some factual
basis. Of course, the government retains the right to search under the
general exceptions created for protective frisks and searches incident to
arrest when appropriate levels of probable cause are reached. The right
to use the magnetometer on each passenger remains, and under a modi-
fied application of the Meulener and Epperson decisions, the authorities
could use the detection of an unexplained amount of metal on the per-
son of the passenger or in his carry-on luggage as the sole basis for con-
ditioning the right to travel.
The one major interest that is sacrificed by such a solution is the
claimed right of the FAA to require a search of all carry-on luggage. It
is submitted that such a mass search would be constitutionally acceptable
only if the passenger were given a final option of avoiding the search by
placing such items in stowage. This would preserve both the right to
travel and the right to privacy.
Another possible solution would be the creation of a new and limited
exception based on the protective frisk exception, as was suggested in
Lindsey. Such a plan should be qualified, however, by a proviso that all
evidence seized, other than weapons, be subject to the exclusionary
rule. A selective application of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of a
particular search based on the nature of the items seized would be a
novel approach. It would serve the purpose, however, of narrowing the
scope of the invasion to the precise objective of the compelling govern-
ment interest. This would serve to minimize the chilling effect of such
searches on the right to travel; additionally, it would prevent the use of
such searches as a general procedure to limit the flow of contraband in
the United States.
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